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Perception, True Opinion and Knowledge
in Plato's Theaetetus
WILLIAM BONDESON 
everal years ago Mr. J. Xenakis proposed an interpretation of
some aspects
of the passage in the Theaetetus in which the thesis 
that is oc'LaO-?aLqreceives its final refutation (184B4-
186El2).' Although I agree in the main with his interpretation, I
believe that it can be supported more strongly. Thus an analysis of
this passage is the first task of this paper. But on the basis of that 
analysis, I want to show also how this passage is related to what follows - 
in the dialogue, the long discussion beginning with the thesis that 
knowledge is true opinion but turning almost immediately to a dis- 
cussion of the nature and possibility of false opinion and ending with
the wax block and aviary models (187AI-20OD4).
2
The criticism of the thesis that is cx.(cr8.fJcr?çbegins with the 
distinction between what the soul apprehends through the sense- 
organs and what it apprehends "by itself". Whatever Plato's views 
about the soul might be at his writing of the Theaetetus, he wants to
distinguish between those characteristics which the soul apprehends
through the sense-organs and those characteristics which are called 
"common to everything" 7tOCO'Lxow6v -184C4-5). In spite of his 
expressed desire to be precise (184 C 1-7), Plato has some difficulties 
and ambiguities in his terminology. His general point is to show that 
knowledge cannot be equated with But he does speak, on
the one hand, of what the soul "perceives"
when he talks about the particular objects of the various senses, e.g.
colors, tastes, sounds, etc. On the other hand he also speaks of what
the soul "perceives" (again cx.?cr8&voflcx.? - 185 C8) when he talks about 
the xocva, characteristics which are somehow different from those 
apprehended via the individual sense-organs. The ambiguity in
vottocl leaves two questions to be answered.
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First, what sort of object is "perceived" through the sense-organs?
Plato could mean either a particular object with a particular color
or taste, etc., or he could mean the relevant sense-data. Plato's intro-
duction of the and his saying that the soul "perceives" these
along with what it "perceives" through the sense-organs might be
thought to favor the former interpretation, but it would also be 
consistent with saying that the soul apprehends the xo?v& in relation 
to its sense-data. Although I should have to admit that a more de- 
tailed study of the earlier portions of the Theaetetus where Plato
discusses the interaction of object and sense-organ would help to
decide the issue, it seems that Plato did not clearly decide whether the 
soul perceives sense-data or physical objects. 
Second, what is the sense of "perceive" in each of these cases? 
Does the soul "perceive" one set of characteristics via the sense- 
organs, e.g. colors, sounds, etc., and does it "perceive" a different set 
of characteristics when it operates "by itself", e.g. being, sameness,
otherness, etc.? To use "perceive" in both of these senses causes 
difficulties. Plato apparently wants to distinguish between two sets 
of characteristics, but he also might want to distinguish between
these characteristics in terms of two different operations of the soul. 
Using "perceive" in both these ways leads to some very basic ambi-
guities.
Plato's general point, I believe, is this. Perception
cannot be knowledge because in perception simply are none of the 
These become a factor only when we make comparisons between
the things which are perceived, and, more importantly, they enter
the picture when the "truth" about them becomes an issue. To 
paraphrase the argument in 185 E ff., the soul, when it operates "by
itself" il or iXù? deals with certain charac- 
teristics which are not "viewed" (è7t?O'Xo7tÛv) through the sense- 
organs. The chief of these is "being" (ouo-nx - 186 A 2), and this charac- 
teristic "most of all pertains to everything" (186A2-3). In addition
to this, there are similarity and dissimilarity, sameness and otherness,
beauty and ugliness, and goodness and badness. But the point is that
these are not involved until the soul starts to make comparisons
between its sensations or perceptions, "reflecting within itself upon the
past and present in relation to the future" (186A9-B l). The same 
point is made again in the following lines: all sensations
reach the soul via the body, but reflecting upon them (making judg-
ments about them) is something which the soul does on its own. The
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soul makes its comparisons and reflects about them with regard to
their "being" 186 B 7) and usefulness. The use of o4al« cannot
but be important when it is connected with the following lines where
it is maintained that one cannot attain "truth" without attaining
"being" (186C7) and further that attaining knowledge is attaining
"truth." From these lines it is possible to infer, if my paraphrase is
correct, that Plato is saying that there is a direct connection between
attaining "being" and attaining knowledge since the notion of "truth" 
is connected with both. And he spells out the implications further;
knowledge is not in our sensations but in our reasoning about them
(186D2-3).
If one were to press the case that Plato has changed his views
in the later dialogues, the above passage would be an excellent place
to begin. This passage rather plainly states that knowledge
resides in reasoning about our sensations and not in the 
sensations themselves. Further, the passage states that in order to 
have knowledge we have to apprehend "being" and "truth". But it
does not seem to follow from this that Plato is indirectly hinting at a 
view he has earlier expressed, notably in the Phaedo, that knowledge
results only when Forms are apprehended and that for this apprehen-
sion the senses are to be dispensed with as quickly as possible. The
same view can be found in the Republic along with a very sharp 
distinction between knowledge and opinion in terms of their corre- 
sponding objects. The view that in the Theaetetus Plato is indirectly
attempting to point out the need for Forms is Cornford's3 and, in
my opinion, Robinson has shown it to have severe difficulties.4 
A more plausible interpretation of the passage is as follows. What 
Plato is attempting to point out is that in so far as it is 
only the passive reception of sensory impressions or sense-data (or
even in so far as it is apprehending the characteristics of physical
objects) cannot give us anything which can be called "true." It is only
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when we make judgments about what is perceived that the notion of 
"truth" becomes important. And further, Plato seems to be saying
that in this reasoning or judging process, "being" and "truth" have 
the most important roles to play. In spite of the fact that the list of
the xmvcX is a large one, including "being" and "non-being", similarity
and dissimilarity, sameness and otherness (185 C9-D4), Plato focuses
upon "being" as the most important and most pervasive of these 
(186A2-3), and precisely because «la0raiq does not deal with these,
it cannot be equivalent to But the meaning of "truth"
and "being" here are crucial, and the interpretation of this section
depends on what is meant by these terms.
However, before elaborating the meaning of these terms, I should
point out that in this final section (184 85-187A6) of the first part
of the dialogue (i.e. the examination of the equals
thesis) there are two lists of the xocva which the soul deals with when
it operates "on its own" (185 C 9-D 4 and 186 A 2-8) . Moral and aesthetic 
terms appear in the second list and not in the first, whereas numerical
terms appear in the first and not in the second. Similarity and dis- 
similarity appear in both along with terms which appear to be con-
nected with the discussion of the Sobhist, i.e. "being" and "non- 
being", sameness and otherness. The only terms which appear in both 
these lists and which are not mentioned in the Sophist are similarity
and dissimilarity and the value terms. The terms which appear in the
Theaetetus are used in the Sophist as parts of Plato's views about state-
ments and language in general, pointing to what I think Plato is 
trying to accomplish in these critical sections of the Theaetetus.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that Plato does want to point
out in the Theaetetus some features of which iXta8'Y)c:ne;;does
not have. I suggest that because these are 1) that ala0raiq does not 
deal with "being" and 2) that it does not yield truth, Plato is main-
taining that knowledge is propositional. In order to have knowledge
there must be truth, and further, truth requires statements or prop-
ositions. If this claim is correct, then Plato is making a logical
point about namely that in it no statements or judgments
about what is perceived are involved. Plato is saying that the concepts
of truth and falsity do not apply to ala0raiq but apply only when
judgments are made. I do not believe Plato to be saying that in order 
for there to be knowledge there must be an apprehension of Forms 
as Cornford maintains. Such an interpretation would be introducing
another element into the discussion which does not seem to be neces-
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sary for the refutation of the thesis. Thus it is difficult to see how the
introduction of Forms could be Plato's point here. He rather seems to 
be making a distinction between and not in terms 
of a distinction between the intelligible things apprehended in the 
former and the perceptible things apprehended in the latter, but in-
stead in terms of a distinction between the non-propositional character
of and the propositional character of Many more
problems are, of course, left to be solved with regard to what knowl- 
edge is, and these will occupy the remainder of the dialogue, but it 
does appear that its propositional character is sufficient at this point
to distinguish it from and that this is all Plato needs to show
for the moment. But as is stated in the dialogue, these arguments
only show that knowledge is not perception (187Al-6); we have yet
to find out positively what it is and whether it is true opinion or
something else.
I shall consider another passage in the Theaetetus which seems to 
support my view because it, like the passage just discussed, considers
what the soul does when it reasons or judges. Approximately two
Stephanus pages after the discussion of the participants
turn to a definition of "thought" in 189 E 4-190 A 6. "Thought"
is the discourse (x6yoq) of the soul with itself
186 E 6-7). The language here is very similar to that used in 
the earlier passage about the XOLVOC and seems to refer back to it. This
discourse is unspoken and is the result of the soul's silent questioning
and answering which ends in its forming an opinion. By means of 
affirmation and denial (cp«axovT« x«1 ou an opinion is formed;
having an opinion is a form of discourse on the part of the 
soul with itself. This passage seems to mean that "thought" is propo-
sitional ; it is expressed in statements, and these statements can be 
positive or negative. Having an opinion or making a judgment ac-
cording to Plato, then, is saying that a certain proposition is true or 
false. The statement can be positive or negative since it is the result 
of affirmation or denial. 
The fact that this passage and the one in 185-187 discuss what 
appear to be operations peculiar to the soul (as opposed to the passive
reception of sensations), and their similarities of language justify read-
ing them together. Although the former seems to be talking about
the operations of the soul "on its own", while the latter talks about 
"thought," both seem to be maintaining that the making of statements 
or judgments is involved in each case. What this leads to, I think,
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is that Plato considers both knowledge and opinion to be propositional
in character; both are expressed in statements of the form, "x is y."
But an immediate qualification must be made. To say that "x is y"
is highly ambiguous until we are certain of the senses of "is" and know 
what "x" and "y" stand for. 
Plato could very easily be maintaining that knowledge and belief
are propositional (knowing that x is y, etc.) but still not be clear about 
the various kinds of propositions or statements; he could hold that
knowing and believing take this form, but he could be unclear about
the further distinctions which have to be made in order to get rid of
the difficulties which arise when the various senses of "is" and "is not"
are not properly distinguished. And these, along with some other 
difficulties, seem to cause the problems in the Theaetetus. The mention
of "truth" in the xo?v& passage and the elaborate discussion of false- 
hood in the following sections seem to indicate that Plato was trying
to discover what it is that can properly be called true or false. In 
short, he is concerned about statements.
Immediately after the "thought" passage, the following account of
opinion is given: whenever someone has an opinion, he says "that
one thing is another" (190A8-9). This seems to mean that opining is
opining statements. If Plato is concerned with statements in the
Theaetetus, problems about the nature of statements and their kinds 
provide a philosophical connecting link between the Theaetetus 
and that dialogue to which it is literarily tied, the Sobhist. The Sophist
is the dialogue in which a doctrine about statements is elaborated
(though not with entire success); the propositional character of be-
lieving and knowing is at least implicit in the Theaetetus, although
at a lower level of elaboration. But the passages from the Theaetetus 
discussed above would hardly be sufficient to establish this thesis. 
By discussing further parts of this section, I shall claim that in the 
Theaetetus Plato does have beginnings of the view that knowing
and believing take the form "knowing that..." and "believing that...".
But I shall claim that Plato has not solved the difficulties in this 
view because he has only partially elaborated the distinction between
seeing something on the one hand and believing or knowing something 
on the other. The Theaetetus, I believe, is the place where he is beginning
to see that such a distinction is necessary, but it seems that the equip-
ment for making such a distinction is not fully developed there. Thus,
my claim is that Plato does want to separate ala0raiq from opinion
and knowledge and that he makes this distinction on the grounds
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that the latter two are propositional. Furthermore, Plato raises 
difficulties about the view which holds that believing x is y entails
being acquainted (in more modern terminology) with what is named
by the terms "x" and "y". This view also seems to assimilate all 
cases of "x is y" to "x is identical with y." That difficulties are raised 
about this view is a point of considerable significance. I shall discuss 
this significance at the end of this paper.
To substantiate my claims, I shall discuss two sections of the 
Theaetetus. First, I shall discuss the opening of the second section of
the dialogue beginning with the examination of the thesis that knowl-
edge is true opinion but turning instead to a discussion of false
opibion and raising some difficulties about the relations between seeing,
hearing, etc., and believing. Second, I shall discuss the aviary and
wax block models which are put forward to explain how false beliefs 
or opinions are possible but which are rejected as inadequate models.
Just after Plato's denial of the thesis that is
ending at 187A6, the participants turn to the thesis that '7rt e 
is true opinion. But instead of immediately developing this thesis,
they turn to an examination of false opinion and how it is possible.
This problem serves as a connecting link between the Theaetetus
and the Sophist. The section in the Theaetetus begins with a rigid
distinction between "knowing and not knowing" (188A5-6). In
accounting for false opinion, then, one either knows or does not know 
Socrates and Theaetetus. If they are not known in this sense (and
here "know" seems to be equal to "be acquainted with"), then one 
of them cannot be mistaken for the other; if they are both known,
mistaking is again out of the question. This, of course, gets nowhere
as an explanation of false opinion, and the field of investigation is
changed from that of the "knowing" dichotomy to that of "being
and non-being" (xaTa To elvai xal y% - This leaves 
us with an account of false opinion as ra' ovnx (188 D 2-5),
a phrase as ambiguous here as it is in the initial stages of the Sophist.
But a distinction is drawn between opining To li7'16v, 1) rrav
and 2) x«6' auTO (188 D 8-10). False opinion, then, is opining 
"what is not" either "in relation to the things that are" or "absolutely."
And the point is further made that both of these are possible accounts
of false opinion. The distinction appears to parallel closely the discus- 
sion of the Sophist in which these two senses of "what is not" are
brought out. But in the case of that dialogue to conceive of To y) 6v
xa0' avTO is impossible because such an "absolute" sense of
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"non-being" cannot be given an intelligible interpretation for Plato. 
The phrase cannot be applied to anything and it is self-contradictory
(cf. Sophist 237A-239B). To believe r'o 6v in this sense is equivalent
to believing nothing which is equivalent to not believing or opining
at all. But to opine or believe "what is not" in the "relative" sense
is shown to be possible in the Sobhist because there it is assimilated
to "what is other than ..." or "what is different from ..." In this
sense believing To 6v is believing that a given identifiable thing has
certain characteristics which are "other than" the ones it actually has.
According to the Sophist, this sense of 6v is expressed in state-
ments, and the distinction between the "absolute" and the "relative"
senses of To yi 6v helps to account for falsity although as part of a far
more elaborate set of views (cf. Sophist, 260-264 8) . Thus, the Theaete-
tus contains a distinction which is highly useful in the Sophist, but
the important difference is that in the Theaetetus the account of
false belief is given in both of these senses of To 
Clearly something is wrong in the Theaetetus because the participants
are unable to give a satisfactory account of false opinion. The distinc-
tion between these senses of "non-being" is not maintained nor even
mentioned in the long sections on the wax block and aviary models
which seem designed to show not so much that knowledge cannot be 
true opinion as to point out Plato's realization of the difficulties which
must be overcome in order to solve the problem of falsity. I suggest
that the difficulties lie, on the one hand, in the reply which applies
"believing what is not true" to both senses of To yQ and, on the 
other hand, in the assimilation of believing or opining to seeing,
believing, touching, etc.
The argument which immediately follows the distinction between 
the "absolute" and "relative" senses of "non-being" illustrates well,
I think, the difficulties that are involved. The argument runs that if 
one sees or hears something, then it can be said that one sees or hears 
"some one thing". Moreover, this one thing "is" or "exists" gv yE
Tt.6pK, rCov <i 6pK - 188 E 7 ) . If this holds for seeing and hearing,
etc., then, it is argued, it must hold for believing as well. Thus the "ob- 
ject" of believing should also be considered as "something which is 
one" (sv YE 189A6) and as "something which is" (6v 189A8). 
But if this is correct and serves to account for cases of true belief,
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then when someone believes falsely, he believes "what is not," and
this is immediately assimilated to believing nothing or not believing
at all. By this argument false opinion is impossible (189AlO-l2),
and the conclusion is drawn that false belief is impossible in both 
the absolute and relative senses of "what is not" (189 B 1-2). 
At least two possible interpretations of this passage can be given,
both of which have important consequences for the interpretation of
the remaining sections of the dialogue. First, the argument can be
considered as displaying Plato's confusion and inability to distinguish
between the "objects" of seeing, etc., on the one hand and the "objects"
of believing on the other. The former we could call either physical
objects or sense-data and the latter, statements or propositions. If
this is the case, Plato is correct to say that they are both "one,"
but it seems clear that they are hardly "one" in the same sense. 
The first interpretation would maintain that Plato was impressed
by the unity of both these "objects" and thus did not distinguish
them, and, on this interpretation, it would be correct to say that this
lack of a distinction is what gets Plato into difficulties. But what is 
wrong with this interpretation, I think, is that it overlooks the fact 
that the absurd conclusion of the argument is recognized by the partic-
ipants and that they go on to look for a new account of false opinion.
This leads me to offer a second interpretation which takes the reductio 
form of the argument into account. It appears to me that Plato is
here attempting to point out that distinction which the first inter- 
pretation considers him to be failing to make; it seems that the argu-
ment is designed to show that what one sees or hears is something
quite distinct from what one believes. The failure to draw this distinc- 
tion is one of the crucial factors in making the argument come to its absurd 
conclusion that error is impossible. This is evidence for my view that
Plato has, at least implicitly, the propositional character of opining
or believing in mind since pointing out this difference in "objects"
in one step, although an important one, in that direction. In view 
of the interpretation I have already given of the passages criticizing 
the equation of and which indicates that one of
the crucial differences between the two is that the latter is proposi-
tional, it is reasonable to suppose that Plato may be making the same
sort of attack in the passage just discussed. What this reductio leads 
to in the dialogue is the consideration of the wax block and aviary
models; the senses of "non-being" are dropped from the discussion. 
These models are interesting because they seem to contain as-
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sumptions related to those operating in the reductio argument
just discussed, which leads me to believe that they are meant to 
expose similar difficulties. Both models seem to be maintaining that
believing or opining takes the form "x is y"; believing is believing
"that one thing is another" (TOye I<epov Ë't'EpOV 190 D 4-5) . 
But the difficulties here arise in two ways. First, no distinction is made
in the terminology of the models between the senses of "is," and, in
fact, the predominant sense seems to be the identity sense. Second,
and most important, it seems that most of the difficulties occur because
the "x" and "y" are taken to be names of things with which the holder 
of the belief is acquainted. The assumption seems to be that opining
involves a kind of "grasping" of the object involved (e.g.
T7) 190 C 6-7). The case of the wax block implies
that if a man has an imprint of something in his wax-block soul or 
knows or perceives it, then mistakes about it are out of the question.
False opinion here is characterized as connecting the wrong imprint
with the wrong perception. When this model is applied to numbers,
they are treated in the same way as persons; hence, the man who
thinks that seven plus five equals twelve is actually thinking that
eleven is twelve, but, if he "knows" (is acquainted with) both eleven 
and twelve, then he cannot make mistakes about them. This model,
then, will not account for false opinion. In the same way the aviary
model introduces which can roughly be translated as
"pieces of knowledge". The perfect mathematician has these "pieces of
knowledge" in his soul Tcov 198 A 10 - B 2), 
seeming to mean that he is acquainted with numbers and directly ap- 
prehends them. On this account, then, with all the "pieces of knowledge"
about numbers flying around in his aviary-soul the mathematician
makes a mistake and thinks that eleven is twelve when he grabs one
"piece of knowledge" instead of another; presumably he mistakes the 
"piece of knowledge" of eleven for that of twelve. But if having a
"piece of knowledge" means being acquainted with a number, it is
difficult to see how mistakes occur at all since "knowing" a number 
in this sense would seem to be infallible. As the participants in the
dialogue recognize, to mistake eleven for twelve one would have to 
both "know" and "not-know" each of these numbers. But, if this is
the case, we have to introduce "pieces of misapprehension" along 
with "pieces of knowledge" to account for mistakes. In a "mis-
apprehension" there is nothing to be acquainted with at all. The 
discussion leads the participants to the problem of distinguishing the
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times when one has really gotten hold of a "piece of knowledge"
from the times when one only has a "misapprehension". How is
"knowledge" of a "misapprehension" known? In order to answer this 
question the participants have to introduce "knowledges of know- 
ledges and misapprehensions" ad infinitum
6
Thus neither model is able to account for falsehood. At this point,
the participants return to their original task, the examination of the 
thesis that knowledge is true opinion, and the thesis in its simplest
form is rejected in 210A-C. However, to examine this argument and
the concluding thesis about knowledge is beyond the scope of this
paper. I intend to deal with these elsewhere. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the section of the Theaetetus 
under discussion here? I have pointed out that 1) Plato seems to dif- 
ferentiate between knowledge and perception on the grounds that the 
former involves statements, 2) he indicates in a reductio argument
that the objects of seeing and believing are distinct, 3) he puts for-
ward two senses of To yi 6v in the reductio argument which are dis- 
tinguished in the Sophist but which, in the Theaetetus, are not dis-
tinguished and give the reductio its appearance of being valid,
4) he gives an account of opinion which seems to be propositional
but in which the terms seem to be names of things known by acquaint- 
ance, and 5) he gives two models which use the acquaintance terminol-
ogy and he shows that neither of these can account for false opinion.
It is significant that these arguments and their evident failure to 
account for false opinion are presented at all. That they are presented
as having difficulties would seem to indicate that Plato had some idea 
of what these difficulties were. But did he have a more positive
doctrine about statements in mind? The similarities with the Sophist
suggest such a doctrine. I believe we could say that Plato constructed
the Theaetetus to show that the doctrine about statements in the 
Sophist must be accepted. But this would involve looking deeper 
into Plato's purposes than would seem to be possible because of
the dialogue form of his writing. A less dramatic claim, however,
can be made. The arguments of the Theaetetus and the difficulties
raised about them require, on philosophic grounds, a detailed elabo- 
ration of what statements are if false opinion is to be accounted
for. Indicating that it is statements about something which are the 
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proper objects of belief and that it is these which are true or false
goes a considerable way towards solving these difficulties. What has 
been discussed of the Theaetetus thus far seems to indicate that 
the terms of a statement cannot refer to things which are known by
acquaintance simply. Thus Plato seems to have realized that state-
ments are involved in believing, and from the criticism of
he seems to have realized that they are involved in knowing also.
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